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When two ﬁrms compete for service-sensitive demands based on their product availability, their actionswill affect the future market share reallocation. This problem was ﬁrst studied by Hall and Porteus (2000)
using a dynamic game model. We extend their work by incorporating a general demand model, which enables
us to obtain properties that reveal the dynamics of the game and the behavior of the players. In particular, we
provide conditions under which the market share of a ﬁrm has a positive value and give it an upper bound. We
further extend the game competition model to an inﬁnite-horizon setting. We prove that there exists a stationary
equilibrium policy and that the dynamic equilibrium policy always converges to a stationary equilibrium policy.
We demonstrate that demand patterns will dictate how ﬁrms compete rationally and show the likely outcomes
of the competition.
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1. Introduction
This paper studies competition in product availabil-
ity between two ﬁrms. In a nonmonopoly market, the
immediate customer reaction to a stockout is either
accepting the delayed delivery (backorder, often with
some incentive) or taking the order elsewhere (lost
sales). The standard inventory control theory han-
dles the immediate impact of a stockout satisfacto-
rily from the supplier’s point of view. When the
second action is taken, however, the supplier suf-
fers not only a loss of sales but also a loss of good-
will, which will likely affect future demand for the
product (Schwartz 1966). Clearly, two factors should
be considered when suppliers formulate their pro-
duction and supply strategies in a competitive mar-
ket: the impact of a strategy on future demands and
the possible actions and reactions of the competitors.
Issues related to these two factors have been studied
extensively in the literature, roughly in two research
streams: that considering the impact of a service strat-
egy on future demands and that considering product
substitution and competition.
Schwartz (1966) pointed out that backorder costs
for stockouts cannot fully describe the impact of loss
of goodwill in the future. He proposed a “perturbed
demand” model, in which the demand in any period
equals the potential demand multiplied by a factor
that depends on observed customer fulﬁllment rate.
This research has been followed and extended in
a number of works, including Schwartz (1970), Hill
(1976), Caine and Plaut (1976), and Robinson (1990),
among others.
The literature on product substitution deals with
situations in which two or more suppliers with substi-
tutable products compete in the same market. Exam-
ples include, but are not limited to, McGillivray and
Silver (1978), Parlar and Goyal (1984), Parlar (1985,
1988), Li et al. (1990), Lau (1991), and Wang and Parlar
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(1994). The focus here is on developing strategies for
competition in the current period. Future effects are
ignored.
Similarly, a number of authors have developed strat-
egies for competition based on product availability in
a single period. Li (1992) considered competition in
production speed in a buyer’s market, assuming that
a demand will be ﬁlled by the supplier that produces
the next available product ﬁrst. This line of research
has been followed and extended by Ernst and Cohen
(1992), Li and Lee (1994), and Lederer and Li (1997).
Lippman and McCardle (1997) introduced compe-
tition into the standard newsvendor problem. In their
model, two ﬁrms make ordering decisions at the be-
ginning of a period to compete for the demand in
the current period. When a shortage happens at one
ﬁrm, the unmet demand switches to the other ﬁrm.
Along the same line, Netessine et al. (2006) consid-
ered a two-ﬁrm competition problem in a reorder
point system setting. When a stockout occurs at one
ﬁrm, the unmet demand will either be backordered
or will switch to a competitor immediately. Station-
ary optimal ordering strategies are developed under
four different scenarios. Because future demand is not
affected by current activities, the problem is essen-
tially a one-period problem. Bernstein and Feder-
gruen (2004) considered price and service-sensitive
demands in a one-period setting, using a multiplica-
tive demand model. They showed that the equilib-
rium in an inﬁnite-horizon setting is the same as in
the one-period setting.
From our brief literature review one can see that,
since Schwartz’s work (1966), the two factors—com-
petition in product availability and its future effect—
have more or less been studied separately. The only
exception is Hall and Porteus (2000), who consid-
ered service competition among multiple ﬁrms in a
dynamic setting in which product availability in the
current period affects the expected demand in the
next period.
In this paper, we extend the work by Hall and
Porteus (2000) by incorporating a general demand
model and relax their key assumption on the service
failure pattern. The general demand model enables us
to carry out more in-depth analysis of ﬁrm behavior
under competition. For example, it can be shown
that different demand patterns lead to signiﬁcantly
different valuations by a ﬁrm on its market share.
We prove that the optimal order quantity for a ﬁrm
under availability competition is determined by a
modiﬁed newsvendor critical fractile, and we give
explicit formulas for calculating the unique feedback
Nash equilibrium. We further extend this competition
model to an inﬁnite planning horizon and show that
the dynamic equilibrium ordering policy always con-
verges to a stationary equilibrium policy. We demon-
strate that the underlying demand pattern plays a key
role in determining whether a ﬁrm can survive the
competition in the long run.
This paper is organized as follows. In §2, we intro-
duce a general demand model and discuss its proper-
ties. We then present the dynamic product availabil-
ity competition model. In §3, we show the existence
of and provide explicit formulas for the unique feed-
back Nash equilibrium. In §4, we analyze the behav-
ior of the ﬁrms under competition, especially, how
the value of market share is affected by the demand
pattern. In §5, we discuss availability competition in
an inﬁnite planning horizon. We derive the station-
ary equilibrium policy and show its relationship with
the dynamic equilibrium policy. We further analyze
whether and how a competing ﬁrm can survive under
such competition.
2. Model Basics
Consider the following scenario: Two ﬁrms selling ho-
mogeneous or substitutable products compete over T
periods in the same market. Competition arises be-
cause unsatisﬁed demands in one period will cause
the loss of new demands in the next period propor-
tionally, forcing the ﬁrms to strategize their ordering
decisions to maintain appropriate product-availability
levels. In this section, we ﬁrst introduce our demand
model and then formulate the problem as a dynamic
game.
2.1. Demand Model
Our basic assumptions for the demand are as follows.
Demands at each ﬁrm can be nonstationary over the
ﬁnite planning horizon, but they follow some pattern
characterized by a density function and some param-
eters. Let  be a continuous random variable with
mean 0 and density function f0x, which is continu-
ous on the support S = x	 f0x > 0 and is referred to
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as the seed density. We deﬁne, for some nonnegative
constants a, b, and > 0, a random demand D by
D=+ a+ b (1)
In other words, this demand consists of a determin-
istic mean  and a random noise. The spread of the
random noise is an afﬁne function of the mean de-
mand. When f0x, a, and b are given, we say that the
demand pattern is known. For a given demand pat-
tern, the demand distribution is uniquely determined
by the mean .
Such a demand model includes many widely used
demand models as special cases. We may construct
different demands by selecting different seed densi-
ties and constant parameters. We will focus on the
following two demand patterns:
Additive demand model. If we set a = 0, b > 0, then
D=+ ′ with ′ = b and E′= 0.
Multiplicative demand model. If we set a > 0 and
b= 0, then D=′ with ′ = a+ 1 and E′= 1.
In a market place, a ﬁrm may have a well-estab-
lished brand (or provide superior after sales services)
and reputation and thus enjoy one cluster of cus-
tomers who will always buy from this ﬁrm. These
customers form a demand base for this ﬁrm. In addi-
tion, this ﬁrm also receives random demands from
other customers. The overall demand for this ﬁrm can
be modeled as additive demand. If a ﬁrm does not
have such a well-established brand and reputation, it
will not have the luxury of a ﬁxed demand base, and
the multiplicative demand model deﬁned above may
be a better ﬁt.
A key assumption in Hall and Porteus’ work is
that the expected unmet demand equals Hq/ for
some twice differentiable, decreasing, and strictly con-
vex function H , when the order quantity is q. Essen-
tially, they assume a multiplicative demand model.
The model deﬁned in (1) only requires the continu-
ity of the seed density f0 on its support. As we will
see, additive and multiplicative demands lead to very
different valuations of market shares and competition
outcomes, which shows the importance of a general
demand framework to the analysis of a dynamic com-
petitive market. We now provide some general prop-
erties of the demand model (1).
Let us assume that the nonnegative constant a is
sufﬁciently small so that the support of the seed den-
sity is on the right side of −1/a, that is, S ⊂ x	 x >
−1/a. For the multiplicative demand model, this
assumption guarantees that the realized demand is
always positive. Let f x denote the density of D and
F0 and F the distribution functions corresponding to
f0 and f , respectively. Let s0 = F −10  and s =
F −1 be the levels of inventory required to satisfy all
demands with a probability  0< < 1. We obtain
the following interesting and important properties.
Lemma 1. For the demand deﬁned by Equation 1, we
have for any  ∈ 01
s= as0+ 1+ bs0 (2)∫ s
0
xf xdx= ay0++ by0 (3)
where y0=
∫ s0
−1/a xf0xdx. Furthermore, deﬁne
k0=−1−s0− y0 (4)
then k0 ∈ 01/a and k′0=−1−/f0s0 < 0.
The proof of this lemma, and all the other proofs,
are in the appendix.
Given that the demand is , Equation (4) shows that
−k0 gives the expected satisﬁed demand when the
order quantity is s0. It is also easy to verify that,
for demand D, the expected unsatisﬁed demand is
ED−q+
=ak0
(
F0
(
q−
a+b
))
+bk0
(
F0
(
q−
a+b
))
 (5)
when the order quantity is q. When demand is multi-
plicative, or b = 0, the second term on the right-hand
side of (5) vanishes, reducing to the model used in
Hall and Porteus (2000).
To deﬁne the demand patterns for the two ﬁrms
over T periods, we use subscripts i and j to indicate
(different) ﬁrms and t to indicate a time period when-
ever necessary. For ﬁrm i, the demand in period t is
Dit =it + ait + bit
where it is independent and identically distributed
across all periods, following the same distribution as
that of .
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2.2. Dynamic Competitive Newsvendors
We assume that two ﬁrms (ﬁrm 1 and ﬁrm 2) pro-
vide a perishable homogeneous product or service
to a market that is indifferent to the price or qual-
ity of the product. In each period, the sequence of
events is as follows: At the beginning of a period, each
ﬁrm observes its market share and makes an ordering
decision; then orders arrive at the two ﬁrms; real-
ized demands are either satisﬁed or lost when stock-
out occurs; ﬁnally, unused products are salvaged and
revenue collected. The demand patterns are common
knowledge to both ﬁrms. The initial market allocation
at the beginning of period 1 is also known to both
ﬁrms. The mechanism that determines how the mar-
ket share it is reallocated according to the availabil-
ity competition in each period is essentially the same
as the one used in Hall and Porteus (2000). Thus, its
discussion below will be brief.
Customers who encounter stockouts are called dis-
appointed customers. A ﬁxed proportion of disap-
pointed customers will switch from their current
supplier to the competitor in the subsequent period.
Let qit be the order quantity and Uit be ﬁrm i’s ex-
pected lost sales in period t, i = 12; t = 12     T .
We have Uit = EDit − qit+. The following equation
completely characterizes the market share reallocation
mechanism:
i t+1 =it −#iUit +#jUjt for i= 12$ j = i (6)
where #i#j ∈ 01, are the switching probabilities
for ﬁrms i and j , respectively. We point out that while
the total market size as indicated by (6) is a constant
=0 = 11 + 21, the general results in §§3 and 4
can be carried when the market size is time depen-
dent. We also point out that while in reality it is pos-
sible that some disappointed customers may simply
withdraw from this market, such a scenario is not
considered in this paper. We further assume that the
two ﬁrms will remain in this market for the entire
T periods. The reallocation formula (6) can be rewrit-
ten as follows:
it+1 = gitqitqjtitjt
= it−#i
∫ +	
qit
x−qitfitxdx
+#j
∫ +	
qjt
x−qjtfjtxdx (7)
Equation (6) or (7) provides the link between the cur-
rent ordering decisions and the market reallocation in
the next period.
Let Qi
def= qit≥ 0 denote the set of decisions of ﬁrm
i, i= 12. The total expected proﬁt for ﬁrm i, i= 12,
over the entire planning horizon is
'iQ1Q2=
T∑
t=1
(t−1hitqitit+(T hiT+1iT+1 (8)
where
hitqitit= riqit − ri+ ciEqit −Dit+
t = 1     T (9)
hiT+1iT+1=AiT+1iT+1+BiT+1 (10)
In the above equations, ri is ﬁrm i’s unit proﬁt or
underage cost; ci is ﬁrm i’s overage cost, that is, the
cost of discarding one unit of unsold product at the
end of a period; ( is a discount factor with 0<( < 1;
hitqitit is the expected proﬁt for ﬁrm i in period t
t = 1     T , given its market share and its order-
ing decision; and the last equation deﬁnes, through
the nonnegative parameters AiT+1 and BiT+1, that the
terminal value hiT+1iT+1 is nonnegative and afﬁne
in the exit market share iT+1.
From (8) and (9), we observe that the total expected
proﬁt for either ﬁrm depends on the replenishment
strategy of the competitor, as well as the ﬁrm’s own
strategy. Assuming that the two ﬁrms make their
ordering decisions simultaneously at the beginning of
each period, the decision processes of the two ﬁrms
over the planning horizon constitute a dynamic Nash
game:
max
Qi
'iQ1Q2
s.t. i t+1 =it −#iUit +#jUjt
for i= 12$ j = i and t = 12     T  (11)
3. Feedback Nash Equilibrium
To analyze the optimization problem (11), we need
the concept of a feedback game. Starting from period T ,
after observing the market share allocation, each ﬁrm
solves a one-period newsvendor-type problem. Mov-
ing to period T −1, the current ordering decisions will
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affect both the proﬁts in period T − 1 and the mar-
ket allocation in period T . The single period proﬁt
and market reallocation can be quantiﬁed using Equa-
tions (7) and (9), respectively. With the market reallo-
cation and the optimal ordering decisions in period T ,
the two ﬁrms have full information to determine their
best decisions in period T − 1.
In this way, the two-period game in period T − 1
can be analyzed. We see that to study a t-period prob-
lem t > 1, we have to study a t−1-period problem
ﬁrst. Thus, for the T -period problem deﬁned in §2, the
game solution procedure starts with the two ﬁrms’
best order quantities in period T , then in period T −1,
and backward period by period until period 1. It is in
this regard that this game is referred to as a feedback
game, and the equilibrium of the game is called the
feedback Nash equilibrium (Basar and Olsder 1995):
Deﬁnition 1. For the two-ﬁrm game model de-
ﬁned by (11), the set of decisions or strategies Q∗1Q
∗
2
constitute a (pure) feedback Nash equilibrium if and
only if functions '∗it·, i = 12; t = 12     T , exist
and satisfy the following recursive relations:
'∗ititjt
= max
qit
{
hitqitit+('∗i t+1
[
gitqit q
∗
jtitjt
gjtq
∗
jt qitjtit
]}
= hitq∗itit+('∗i t+1
[
gitq
∗
it q
∗
jtitjt
gjtq
∗
jt q
∗
itjtit
]
 (12)
'∗i T+1iT+1jT+1=AiT+1iT+1+BiT+1 (13)
The corresponding Nash equilibrium proﬁt for ﬁrm i
is '∗i1i1j1.
Theorem 1 provides the Nash equilibrium of the
game. Its proof is similar to that of Theorem 3 of Hall
and Porteus (2000) and is omitted here.
Theorem 1. A unique pure feedback Nash equilib-
rium exists and is given by
q∗it = sitit= as0it+ 1it + bs0it
t = 12     T  (14)
The corresponding expected proﬁt for ﬁrm i from period t
to period T + 1 is
'∗ititjt=Aitit +Bit
t = 12     T T + 1 (15)
where for t = T , T − 1    1,
it =
(#iAi t+1+ ri
(#iAi t+1+ ri+ ci
 (16)
Ait = (Ai t+1+ ri+ a(#iAi t+1+ ri+ ciy0it
−(#jak0jtAi t+1 (17)
Bit = (Bi t+1+(#jbk0jt+ ak0jt0Ai t+1
+ b(#iAi t+1+ ri+ ciy0it (18)
and for t = 12     T ,
i t+1 = 1−#iak0itit +#jak0jtjt
−#ibk0it+#jbk0jt
4. Duopoly Analysis
The parameter Ait plays a key role in this two-ﬁrm
game. Similar to the standard newsvendor problem,
the optimal order quantity in period t for the dy-
namic competitive newsvendor problem is deﬁned
by a “critical fractile” it . The difference here is the
additional term (#iAi t+1 (see Equation (16)), which
measures the additional underage cost for loss of
goodwill in the future. Because the market allocation
it and thus the optimal order quantities are functions
of it , they are essentially determined by Ait . Further-
more, as the coefﬁcient of it in (15), Ait measures
the impact of the starting market share on the corre-
sponding ﬁrm’s total proﬁt in the remaining planning
horizon; consequently, it represents the value of mar-
ket share for a competing ﬁrm. Thus, the signiﬁcance
of understanding Ait and its impact is obvious.
To analyze the behavior and the role of Ait for
the general demand pattern, we need the following
lemma:
Lemma 2. Let ix= (#ix+ ri/(#ix+ ri+ci, S¯ =
x	 x≤ ri/aci, and deﬁne, for x≥ 0
J+i x= 1−(x−ri−a(#ix+ri+ciy0ix (19)
J++i x=−ri−a(#ix+ri+ciy0ix (20)
These two functions have the following properties: J+i x=0
has a unique positive solution A+i ; if S is not a subset of S¯,
J++i x = 0 has a unique positive solution A++i . If S ⊂ S¯,
J++i x is always nonpositive and we set A
++
i = +	.
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Furthermore, the following statements are true for Ait , A
+
i ,
and A++i :
(1) A+i < A
++
i .
(2) If Ai t+1 ∈ 0A+i  for i = 12, then Ait ∈ 0A+i 
for i= 12.
(3) If Ai t+1 ∈ 0A++i  for i= 12, then Ait ∈ 0A++i 
for i= 12.
To understand the dynamics of the two competing
ﬁrms and determine whether a ﬁrm should compete
aggressively, we must ﬁrst determine whether the
market value Ait is positive or not. Hall and Porteus
(2000) pointed out that when demands are multiplica-
tive and #i < 1/2 for all i, Ait is nonnegative. With
Lemma 2, we can now signiﬁcantly relax the condi-
tions for Ait to be nonnegative.
Theorem 2. The value of market share Ait is nonnega-
tive, if either of the following two conditions is satisﬁed.
Condition 1. AiT+1 <A
++
i , for i= 12.
Condition 2. #iak0iA
++
i  + #jak0j0 ≤ 1, for
i j= 12 and i j= 21.
Theorem 2 tells us that either the value of the exit
market share is not too large, or the value of the
current market share is increasing in the value of
the next period’s market share when it is sufﬁciently
large, the market share is always valuable in any
period. It is easy to see that at least one of the two
conditions is true for most practical settings. There-
fore, we expect that competition will in general force
every competing ﬁrm to raise its replenishment quan-
tity to achieve a higher critical fractile than would be
achieved without considering competition.
Let us consider the following condition.
Condition 3. #1ak010+#2ak020≤ 1.
Condition 3 guarantees that the value of the current
market share is always increasing in the value of the
next period’s market share. Condition 3 implies Con-
dition 2 in Theorem 2. By Lemma 1, Condition 3 is
always satisﬁed if #i < 1/2 for all i, which is the con-
dition set in Hall and Porteus (2000). Condition 3 is
very mild and can be satisﬁed by most parameter set-
tings. Consider, for example, exponential (multiplica-
tive) demands. It is easy to check that Condition 3 in
this case becomes
#1c1
r1+ c1
+ #2c2
r2+ c2
≤ 1
This should be true for most parameter settings.
The above result basically says that a ﬁrm knows
whether to compete actively for market share by
looking at the sign of Ait . The next step is to under-
stand how Ait evolves over time. The following gen-
eral result shows how the competition dynamics will
change in response to changing a and other parame-
ters, given everything else remains the same.
Proposition 1. Under Condition 3, the value of mar-
ket share Ait is decreasing (nonincreasing) in parameters
a, ci, and cj , respectively, and increasing (nondecreasing)
in parameters ri, rj , and (, respectively.
The parameter a measures the extent to which de-
mand variability is affected by market share. Thus,
Proposition 1 shows that the more the market share
affects the demand variability, the less valuable it is
to the ﬁrm. When a= 0, we have an additive market,
and the market share reallocation rule reduces to
i t+1 =it −#ibk0it+#jbk0jt
The following result can then be easily obtained.
Corollary 1. When demands are additive, Ait is
always positive and the following relation holds:
Ait = (Ai t+1+ ri (21)
Relation (21) shows that the optimal availability
strategies of the competing ﬁrms are independent of
each other in an additive market. We have this simple
relation because when a = 0, the demand variability
and the market share are independent of each other.
With a general demand model, the exact evolution
of the parameter Ait is quite involved. However we
can see from Proposition 1 that the Ait given by (21)
is an upper bound for the corresponding Ait for the
general demand pattern.
5. Stationary Policy
In this section, we consider the two-ﬁrm game in
an inﬁnite horizon. We want to answer the follow-
ing questions: Does a stationary equilibrium policy al-
ways exist? If it exists, is it unique? Will the dynamic
equilibrium policy converge to the stationary equilib-
rium policy? Finally, under what conditions can a ﬁrm
survive a long-term product availability competition?
Liu, Shang, and Wu: Dynamic Competitive Newsvendors with Service-Sensitive Demands
90 Manufacturing & Service Operations Management 9(1), pp. 84–93, © 2007 INFORMS
From the equilibrium given in Theorem 1, we ob-
serve that Ait is the only time-varying parameter in
the critical fractile. Thus, to determine whether a sta-
tionary equilibrium exists, we only need to check
whether there is a ﬁxed-point solution for the recur-
sive equation that deﬁnes Ait .
Theorem 3. There exists at least one ﬁxed point A1−	
A2−	 for Equation (17), with Ai−	 ∈ 0A+i  for i =
1 2. If the function lix= axk0ix is nondecreasing
in x for x ∈ 0A+i , i= 1 2, then the ﬁxed point is unique.
For additive demands, lix = 0 and hence is non-
decreasing in x. For exponential demands, it is easy
to check that lix = cix/(#ix + ri + ci is increasing
in x. Therefore, Theorem 3 guarantees the uniqueness
of the stationary equilibrium policy when demands
are either additive or exponential. We conjecture that
the ﬁxed point for Equation (17) is unique for other
demand patterns, although we are currently unable
to prove it without the assumption on lix.
Our next question concerns the relationship be-
tween dynamic policy and stationary policy. We can
demonstrate that under mild conditions, the dynamic
policy will converge to the stationary policy.
Proposition 2. Under Condition 3, the dynamic equi-
librium policy deﬁned by Theorem 1 always converges to a
stationary equilibrium policy if either of the following two
conditions is satisﬁed:
(1) AiT+1 = 0, i= 12.
(2) The ﬁxed point for Equation (17) is unique.
Finally, we discuss whether the competition is sus-
tainable. We consider this question in an inﬁnite-
horizon setting to see more clearly what factors
determine a ﬁrm’s survivability. For clarity, a compe-
tition is said to be sustainable for ﬁrm i if ﬁrm i’s
market share is always positive throughout the game.
A more general deﬁnition is to require the market
share to always be no less than some predetermined
positive level. This will not add theoretical difﬁculty
and can be similarly discussed.
Proposition 3. For the inﬁnite-horizon game, we
deﬁne 3i = #ik0iAi−	 as ﬁrm i’s critical factor.
Under Condition 3, we have:
(1) The ﬁrm with a smaller critical factor can always
survive; i.e., ﬁrm i can survive if 3i ≤3j .
(2) If 3i > 3j , ﬁrm i can survive if and only if
b3i/3j − 1 < a0.
(3) If the competition is sustainable for both ﬁrms, the
market share for ﬁrm i in the steady state equals i1 if de-
mands are additive and equals 03j/3i+3j−b3i−3j/
a3i+3j otherwise.
We observe that, essentially, different demand pat-
terns dictate different levels of competition. Additive
demands are associated with cut-throat competition,
and only the strongest ﬁrms (with the smallest crit-
ical factors) will survive. That is because for addi-
tive demands, the demand variance is independent
of the mean demand, and hence the coefﬁcient of
variation of the demand is decreasing in the mean
demand. Therefore, the ﬁrms will aggressively com-
pete for more market share to enjoy increasing returns
to scale. In a market where brand name is highly
valued, much of the potential proﬁt is divided by a
few strong ﬁrms. Without competing in price, a new
ﬁrm can join the competition only by being able to
attract a sufﬁciently large and stable customer base
(through good branding). With a multiplicative mar-
ket, ﬁrms can always coexist in the market and be
proﬁtable. When demands are neither additive nor
multiplicative, it is possible that weak ﬁrms can sur-
vive when their critical factors are not too large. With
the more general deﬁnition of survivability we have
mentioned, we can conclude from Proposition 3 that
the competition is sustainable for both ﬁrms if and
only if their critical factors are sufﬁciently close to
each other.
Our next question is how different parameters af-
fect the critical factor. Consider an additive market. By
Equation (21), Ai−	 = ri/1−(; hence the stationary
critical fractile for ﬁrm i is
iAi−	=
ri+#iri(/1−(
ri+#iri(/1−(+ ci
 (22)
Notice that k0 is decreasing in . To reduce 3i, we
need to increase i by increasing ri and reducing ci, as
in a standard newsvendor problem. The impact of #i
is more involved. We note from (22) that with larger
#i, ﬁrm i will raise its service level to hedge against
higher switching potential, which tends to reduce 3i.
However, the direct effect of a larger #i, by the deﬁni-
tion of 3i, is to increase 3i proportionally. We believe
that for most problem settings, the net effect of a
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larger switching probability is to increase the critical
factor. For multiplicative demands, we believe that
the effects of the parameters are similar, but the anal-
ysis is much more complicated.
6. Summary
In this paper, we study product availability compe-
tition between two ﬁrms using a general demand
model. We ﬁrst show that a unique feedback Nash
equilibrium strategy exists in a dynamic competition,
and both the equilibrium order quantity and the cor-
responding discounted proﬁt are linearly increasing
in the market share of a competing ﬁrm. We also show
that the value of market share depends strongly on
how much the market share affects the demand vari-
ability (randomness). Firms with additive demands
value their market shares more than those with mul-
tiplicative demands, because the demand variability
with additive demands is independent of the market
share. This qualitative understanding, presented in §4,
is a major contribution of this paper.
Our second major contribution is to show that when
this game is played in an inﬁnite horizon, a station-
ary equilibrium always exists, and in most cases, this
equilibrium is unique. We further demonstrate that
under some mild conditions, the dynamic strategy
always converges to a stationary policy. From both the
dynamic and stationary game analyses, we can see
that the demand pattern plays a major role in deter-
mining the equilibrium and the competitive behavior.
Furthermore, we show that the survivability of a ﬁrm
in the competition is intimately related to the demand
pattern it faces. In summary, by examining this gen-
eral demand pattern, we are able to develop a broader
and deeper understanding of the product availability
competition than currently presented in the literature.
One of the main assumptions in our model is that
customers decide whether to switch to a different
ﬁrm based only on their experiences with their cur-
rent supplier in the previous period. This translates
to a demand-switching model in which a proportion
of the expected unsatisﬁed demand will change sup-
plier. Any change in demand characteristics is totally
determined by the change of the expectation. In
practice, customers’ switching behavior in some com-
petitive environments may be more complicated, and
different demand models may be required. For exam-
ple, if customers have access to all the demand infor-
mation and how demands are satisﬁed in the previous
period, we will have a very different problem and
demand model. We may need a setting in which
the demand variance is directly and simultaneously
affected by the service level. This is obviously a chal-
lenging and interesting research topic.
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Appendix. Proofs
Proof of Lemma 1. From Equation (1), the demand dis-
tribution function F x satisﬁes F x= F0x−/a+ b,
and f x= f0x−/a+ b/a+ b. Therefore, s0=
s−/a+ b or s= as0+ 1+ bs0, and
∫ s
0
xf xdx
=
∫ s
0
x−
a+ b f0
(
x−
a+ b
)
dx+
∫ s
0
f xdx
= a+ b
∫ s0
−1/a
xf0xdx+
=
(
a
∫ s0
−1/a
xf0xdx+
)
+ b
∫ s0
−1/a
xf0xdx
The ﬁrst equation above leads to (2), while the second equa-
tion leads to (3). By the derivative rule of the inverse func-
tion, we have
s′0 = 1/f0s0
y′0 =
[∫ s0
−1/a
xf0xdx
]′
= s0
From these two formulas, we can obtain k′0 = −1− /
f0s0 < 0. k00=−s00 < 1/a and k01= 0, thus k0 ∈
01/a. 
Proof of Lemma 2. Function J+i x is strictly increasing
in x for x ≥ 0 because J+′i x = 1− (+ (#iak0ix > 0.
Because ay0i0+ i0 can be treated as the coefﬁcient
of  in Equation (3), it must be positive; hence J+i 0 =
−ri+ciay0i0+i0 < 0. It is also clear that J+i +	=
+	. So J+i x= 0 has a unique positive solution A+i .
Similarly, J++i x is also an increasing function with
J++i 0 < 0. Applying the L’Hopital’s rule, J
++
i +	=−ri +
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acis01. S ⊂ S¯ implies J++i +	≤ 0; hence J++i x is always
nonpositive. Otherwise, J++i +	 > 0 and J++i x= 0 has a
unique ﬁnite positive solution A++i .
For ﬁnite A++i , since J
+
i x is an increasing function and
J+i A
++
i  = 1 − (A++i + J++i A++i  = 1 − (A++i > 0, State-
ment (1) is true. When A++i =+	, the conclusion is obvious.
Consider Statement (2). By deﬁnition,
Ait = 1−(#jak0jtAi t+1− J+i Ai t+1 (23)
Here the coefﬁcient (#jak0jt ∈ 01, because from
Lemma 1 we have k0jt ∈ 01/a. If Ai t+1 ∈ 0A+i , then
J+i Ai t+1 ≤ 0, and we have Ait ≥ −J+i Ai t+1 ≥ 0 from
Equation (23). We notice that Ait is convex in Ai t+1, as
4Ait
4Ai t+1
= (−(#iak0it−(#jak0jt
42Ait
4A2i t+1
=− (
2#2i ciak
′
0it
(#iAi t+1+ ri + ci2
> 0
(24)
To show Ait ≤ A+i , for Ai t+1 ∈ 0A+i , we only need to
consider the cases when Ai t+1 = 0 and Ai t+1 = A+i . When
Ai t+1 = 0, Ait = ri + ciay0i0+ i0. Denote Gi(=
J+i ri + ciay0i0+ i0. It is easy to verify Gi0= 0
and
G′i(=−Ait1−#iak0iAit < 0
Thus J+i Ait = Gi( < 0, which leads to Ait < A+i . Finally
when Ai t+1 = A+i and with J+i A+i  = 0, it is obvious from
Equation (23) that Ait ≤ A+i . Statement (3) can be shown
similarly. 
Proof of Theorem 2. Using Statement (3) of Lemma 2
repeatedly, we can see that Ait ∈ 0A++i  for all i and t if
Condition 1 is true. Suppose that Condition 1 does not hold,
that is, AiT+1 ≥ A++i for some ﬁnite A++i , but Condition 2
holds. From Equation (24) (and noting that k0 is decreas-
ing in  and hence k0ix is decreasing in x), Condition 2
implies that, given ﬁxed Aj t+1 ≥ 0, Ait is increasing in Ai t+1
for Ai t+1 ≥A++i . Thus we again are sure of Ait ≥ 0 for all i
and t. 
Proof of Proposition 1. When t = T + 1, the terminal
parameter AiT+1 is prior and thus nonincreasing on a. Sup-
pose the statement is true for t + 1. Then in period t, we
have
dAit
da
= 4Ait
4Ai t+1
dAi t+1
da
+ (#iAi t+1+ ri + ciy0it
−(#j
[
k0jt+ ak′0jt
4jt
4Aj t+1
dAj t+1
da
]
Ai t+1
Condition 3 guarantees that Ait is nonnegative for any i and
t, and Ait is increasing in Ai t+1; hence 4Ait/4Ai t+1 > 0. We
also have dAi t+1/da≤ 0 by assumption. Thus, the ﬁrst term
on the right-hand side of the above equation is nonpositive.
By the deﬁnition of y0, we can see that the second term is
negative. By Lemma 1, k0jt≥ 0 and k′0jt < 0. Obviously,
4jt/4Aj t+1 > 0, and dAj t+1/da ≤ 0 by assumption. Thus,
the last term is also nonpositive. Therefore, we have shown,
by induction, that dAit/da < 0 for all i and t ≤ T . Other
sensitivity results can be similarly discussed. 
Proof of Theorem 3. From Statement (2) of Lemma 2,
Equation (17) deﬁnes a continuous mapping from a com-
pact set 0A+1  × 0A+2  to itself. By Brouwer’s Theorem
(see, for example, Border 1985), this mapping guarantees
the existence of at least one ﬁxed point A1−	A2−	 ∈
0A+1 × 0A+2 .
From Equation (23), there is no ﬁxed point outside the
region 0A+1 × 0A+2 . We only consider 0A+1 × 0A+2 
for ﬁxed points. From Equation (23), we can see that any
ﬁxed point A1−	A2−	 should satisfy:
−J+i Ai−	 = (#jak0j Aj−	Ai−	
= (#j lj Aj−	Ai−	/Aj−	 (25)
for i = j . When a= 0, it is clear that the ﬁxed point is unique
and given by A+1 A
+
2 . In the following, we consider the
case with a > 0. Suppose a different ﬁxed point exists.
We can deﬁne it as A′1−	A
′
2−	 = 61A1−	 62A2−	
for 61 > 1 without loss of generality. It is clear that 0 ≤
−J+1 A′1−	 < −J+1 A1−	, as J+1 x is a strictly increasing
function. For the ﬁrst equality of (25) to hold for both
ﬁxed points with i j= 12, we require k02A′2−	 <
k02A2−	, which is equivalent to 62 > 1, because
k02x is decreasing in x. Consider the second equality
of (25) for both ﬁxed points with i j = 12; we have
1 > l2A′2−	61/l2A2−	62 ≥ 61/62. The second inequality
comes from our assumption that l2x is nondecreasing in
x for x ∈ 0A+2  and the fact that A′2−	 >A2−	. Therefore,
we have 62 > 61 > 1. Similarly, Equation (25) with i j =
21 should also hold for these two ﬁxed points, but this
will lead to 61 > 62 > 1—a contradiction. Therefore, the ﬁxed
point must be unique. 
Proof of Proposition 2. First, we discuss the implica-
tions of Condition 3 on the mappings deﬁned by Equation
(17). Consider two mappings: Ai t+1Aj t+1 to AitAjt
and A′i t+1A
′
j t+1 to A
′
itA
′
jt. Condition 3 implies the fol-
lowing facts: (1) If 0 ≤ Ai t+1 ≤ A′i t+1 ≤ A+i , 0 ≤ Aj t+1 =
A′j t+1 ≤ A+j , then Ait ≤ A′it and Ajt ≤ A′jt ; and (2) if 0 ≤
Ai t+1 ≤A′i t+1 ≤A+i , 0≤Aj t+1 ≤A′j t+1 ≤A+j , then Ait ≤A′it
and Ajt ≤A′jt .
We ﬁrst prove fact (1). Under Condition 3, Equation (24)
implies that Ait is increasing in Ai t+1 for ﬁxed Aj t+1.
Thus, Ait ≤ A′it . Condition 3 also implies that Ait is non-
negative for any i and t. Because k0ix is decreasing
in x, we can see from (17) that Ajt is increasing in Ai t+1
for ﬁxed Aj t+1. This shows Ajt ≤ A′jt . To prove fact (2),
we consider the pairs Ai t+1Aj t+1 A′i t+1Aj t+1 and
A′i t+1Aj t+1 A
′
i t+1A
′
j t+1. Applying fact (1) twice, we
can see fact (2) is also true.
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Now, we prove the proposition under Condition (1). We
use induction to show that Ait ≥Ai t+1 for all i and t. With
AiT+1 = 0 and Statement (2) of Lemma 2, this is obviously
true for t = T . Suppose the above relation is true for some t.
Applying fact (2) to the pair Ai t+1Aj t+1 and AitAjt,
we have Ai t−1 ≥ Ait for all i. Therefore, the sequence
AiT+1−7 7 is nondecreasing and bounded from above by
A+i (by Lemma 2). By the monotone convergence theorem,
AiT+1−7 7 will converge to some constant. Clearly, the lim-
iting vector is a ﬁxed point of Equation (17).
Finally, we assume that Condition (2) is satisﬁed. Just
consider nonadditive demands. Without loss of general-
ity, we further assume that AiT+1 ∈ 0A+i  for i = 12.
Otherwise, AiT+1 > A
+
i for some i; together with Equa-
tion (23), this implies that Ait ∈ 0A+i  for some t with
i = 12. We construct two sequences A1i T+1−7 A1j T+1−7 7
and A2i T+1−7 A
2
j T+1−7 7 deﬁned by Equation (17) with
A
1
i T+1 = 0 and A2i T+1 = A+i for i = 12. We have shown
that the sequence A1i T+1−7 A
1
j T+1−7 7 will converge to
a ﬁxed point of Equation (17). From the same discus-
sion, we can show that the sequence A2i T+1−7 A
2
j T+1−7 7
will also converge to a ﬁxed point. From the inequali-
ties A1i T+1 ≤ AiT+1 ≤ A2i T+1 for i = 12, and fact (2), we
have A1i T+1−7 ≤ AiT+1−7 ≤ A2i T+1−7 for all 7 and i = 12.
Take the limit 7 →+	 and notice that lim7→+	A1i T+1−7 =
lim7→+	A
2
i T+1−7 for i = 12, we can conclude that the
sequence AiT+1−7 AjT+1−7 7 will converge to the unique
ﬁxed point of Equation (17). 
Proof of Proposition 3. With both ﬁrms adopting the
stationary equilibrium policy, the market share is reallo-
cated according to i t+1 = 1 − a3i − a3jit + a3j0 −
b3i + b3j .
For additive demands, a= 0. If 3i = 3j , the market allo-
cation will be time invariant and the two ﬁrms will always
keep their starting market allocation. If 3i > 3j , then ﬁrm i
will expect to lose b3i−3j customers in each period until
it gets ruined. These show Statements (1) to (3) for additive
demands.
When demands are nonadditive, a > 0. By Condition 3,
1− a3i − a3j ∈ 01. Therefore, it will monotonically con-
verge to 03j/3i + 3j − b3i − 3j/a3i + 3j, which is
positive if and only if either 3i ≤3j or otherwise b3i/3j−1
< a0. These conﬁrm the proposition for nonadditive
demands. 
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